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THE MEXICAN VIEW ON THE OPERATION OF NAFTA FOR
THE RESOLUTION OF CANADA-U.S.-MEXICO DISPUTES
GuillermoAguilarAlvarez*

I am very glad to be here, and I am very grateful for being allowed to
intrude in what would have otherwise been a very bilateral meeting. I have
been asked to address the operation of the NAFTA from the Mexican
perspective. To do that, I would like to avoid merely speaking of the
institutional framework in dispute settlement. For Mexico, the importance of
NAFTA cannot be understood unless you take a look at its economic impact.
NAFTA has been the engine for growth in Mexico from the date of its
implementation. If you look at 1995, which was a year of economic crisis
and recession during that period, Mexican exports to the NAFTA region
grew considerably. If you look at the figures after 1996, and you compare
total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the contribution of exports to that
growth, you will realize the growth of the Mexican economy depends heavily
on exports. In 1998, almost ninety-four percent of Mexican exports were to
the NAFTA region: 87.5% to the United States and 6.3% to Canada.
If you look at the rate of growth of Mexican regional exports, Mexico has
experienced double digit growth since the NAFrA was implemented and in
some of the years prior. One relevant year was 1986, because that is the year
Mexico started implementing its trade-liberalizing measures. Bilateral
Mexico-U.S. trade was 120 billion dollars a year in 1998. It will probably be
something like 130 to 140 billion dollars for 1999. That figure, even from
that considerable base, has continued to grow at two digits in the first quarter
of 2000.
So when you think of Mexico-U.S. disputes, you have to think of them in
the context of a 140 billion dollar relationship. Increase in total trade is
122.3% since the NAFTA was implemented and Mexican exports to the
United States have increased 140% since the implementation of the NAFTA.
Mexican imports from the United States have also grown at the considerable
rate of 105.5%. Peaks in trade in the case of Mexico and Canada as
compared to the rest of the world can be explained primarily as a result of the
NAFTA. If you look at trade figures after 1994, and you look at Mexico's
shares in total U.S. purchases, it is a direct result of the NAFTA. If you
compare Mexico's exports to the United States with the exports of all of
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Latin America, the figures are quite impressive. The trade figure for all of
Latin America put together, including Brazil, whose economy is four times
larger than Mexico's, their trade figure is 53.7 billion dollars. If you look at
Mexico alone, it was 100.2 billion dollars in 1998. As I said, it will probably
be 120 to 130 billion dollars in 1999 and 2000.
If you look at exports to the United States by selected country groups and
you compare pre-NAFTA and post-NAFTA data, pre-NAFTA Mexico was
in last place, except for Latin America. It still exported more than the rest of
Latin America, but all of the other country groups exported more to the
United States than Mexico in 1993. If you look at figures for 1997, 1998, and
1999, Mexico ranked second, and in 1999 it ranked first, exporting more to
the United States than China and Singapore combined, more than Korea,
Taiwan, and Hong Kong, more than the United Kingdom and France, and
almost twice as much as the rest of Latin America. If you look at the MexicoCanada figures, the increases in total trade, although from a lower base, have
also been pretty impressive. There was an 83.2% increase in total trade.
If you look at the composition of exports to the United States, the figures
exceed any expectation. Manufactured goods are 88.6%, 6% in agricultural
goods (still protected, even under the NAFTA). Oil is only 5.4%. If you look
at figures for 1985, or for 1986, for 70% of Mexican exports to the U.S. were
accounted for by oil. That situation has since been reversed. If you look at
Canada, the composition of our exports are very similar, primarily
manufactured goods.
There is a lot of talk about low wages being an unfair competitive
advantage for some exporting countries. The truth is that more than half of
the 1.7 million jobs that have been created in Mexico since August 1995
have been export related. Firms that exported 80% or more of their product
paid wages that were 44% higher than the rest of the economy. If you look at
compensation during the third quarter, the Maquiladora industry paid wages
that were significantly higher than the rest of the economy.
Clearly, the enactment of the NAFTA has had a tremendous impact on
Mexico's ability to capture foreign direct investment. Prior to the NAFTA,
the highest yearly figure was less than five billion dollars. Immediately after
enactment of the NAFTA, that number doubled to ten billion. In 1997, the
figure was almost fourteen billion dollars, and it was almost eleven billion
dollars for both 1998 and 1999. This is something that you have to bear in
mind when we have these heated discussions about Chapter 11 of the
NAFTA and how it protects investment. It makes a great topic for law review
articles, but when you look at the impact of that protection on the investor's
level of comfort, I would submit that the cost benefit analysis is clearly
favorable.
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Between 1994 and 1998, Mexico received 57.2 billion dollars of FDI.
Almost 60% of that came from the United States and 4.2% came from
Canada. Over 60% of foreign direct investment went to the manufacturing
sector. By April 1998, one of every five workers registered in the Social
Security system had a job with a company that had foreign direct investment
in Mexico. Moreover, companies with foreign direct investment paid wages
that were almost 50% higher than the rest of the economy. Foreign direct
investment is a limited pool. Capital exporting countries only have so many
resources to invest in countries different than their own. China has been by
far the most successful country in capturing foreign direct investment,
prifarily as a result of the size of its economy. Mexico is in second place
with 32.2 billion dollars. Other countries, Malaysia, for example, have half of
the dollars that Mexico captured in the 1994 to 1996 period.
Where did foreign direct investment go in the Mexican economy 62%
went to the manufacturing sector; 1% went to the construction industry; other
industries received 1.1%; services received 6.9% and the growing
transportation and telecommunications industries received 6.6%. That figure
would certainly be larger if we did not have the foreign investment
restrictions in the telecommunications industry that we still have in place.
The banking industry got 10%, and commerce got 12%.
Between 1993 and 1997, Mexico's automotive exports increased 134%.
In 1997, sales of automotive goods represented 19% of Mexico's total
exports, and 22% of our exports of manufactured goods. That is a figure of
over twenty billion dollars. Mexico is the tenth most important exporter in
the world of automobiles and automobile parts. Mexico is the third largest
U.S. provider, and its second largest market for automotive goods. U.S.
exports to Mexico account for 16% of its foreign sales. Trade in automotive
goods grew by 15% between 1993 and 1997 after the entry into force of
NAFTA. Job creation has increased 3%. Labor productivity has also
increased. The industry has accumulated a significant amount of foreign
currency - 9.9 billion dollars during that same period.
The trade balance is still favorable to the United States in the agricultural
and agro-industry in bilateral trade. But this is still a sector where tariffs are
yet to be eliminated. Mexican exports to the United States increased 67%,
which is at a significantly lower rate than the rest of the economy's exports
to the United States. Imports from the United States increased 60%. If you
look at Mexico-Canada agriculture and the agro-industry trade balance,
Mexico's trade balance is in a deficit almost from the outset. But rates of
growth are more important. Mexican exports to Canada have increased
102%, and imports from Canada have increased 82%. That is more in line
with the general statistics for growth in trade between the two countries.
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Mexico is the second largest provider of agricultural goods to the United
States after Canada. In five years, Mexico went from sixth place to third
place as the U.S. provider of agro-industrial goods, after Canada and France.
Mexican exports of fruits and vegetables are expected to grow as tariff
protection is eliminated.
Textiles are another success story for Mexico. Exports of Mexican
apparel to the United States grew 167%. That is almost three times the
growth of agricultural exports. Mexican apparel exports to Canada grew
133%. U.S. sales of apparel to Mexico increased almost 140%, and to
Canada, 70%. If you look at the post-NAFTA trade balance for textile goods,
there was a surplus for Mexico of almost two billion dollars in 1997. 80,000
new jobs were created after the NAFTA went into effect. Mexico became the
sixth most important exporter of textiles and apparel in the world, and it
became the largest exporter of apparel to the United States, more important
than China.
So when you talk about dispute settlement, you have to bear these figures
in mind. You have to realize that every expectation that Mexico had when it
decided to negotiate with the United States and Canada has been realized
with the entry into force of the NAFTA. We also expected the number of
trade and investment disputes to increase and that is why we have dispute
settlement mechanisms. But even if you look at the statistics for the use of
the dispute settlement systems in the NAFTA, there has been considerable
restraint and interest in managing rather than prolonging disputes.
There have been sixteen cases under Chapter 20 disputes. There have
been eleven cases between Mexico and the United States, nine where Mexico
was the claimant and two where the United States was the claimant. There
has been one case between Mexico and Canada against the United States: the
Helms-Burton case. I think Canada was the claimant in that one. There have
been four cases between Canada and the United States, three where Canada
was the claimant, and one where the United States was the claimant. By and
large, the largest category in this pie is disputes between Mexico and the
United States.
How have those disputes progressed in the Chapter 20 stages of the
procedure? Chapter 20, as you know, has three stages. The first stage is
consultations. Then, the Free Trade Commission is convened. If the Free
Trade Commission cannot resolve the dispute, a panel is appointed. So you
start out with sixteen disputes that made it to consultations. Many more
disputes were discussed between the parties even before the consultations
stage in the different committees and working groups that are created under
the NAFTA, serving as a buffer for disputes that do not necessarily have to
percolate to the consultations stage. Out of sixteen disputes that reached the
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stage, six were settled and two were suspended. So only half of the disputes
that entered the Chapter 20 procedure actually proceeded to the commission
stage, where two were settled, two were suspended, and two remain unsettled
but did not go to a panel. Four of the sixteen that were initiated under
Chapter 20 eventually got to the panel stage. Two of them were settled and
two remain in effect, with a decision expected.
After five years we may have two NAFTA disputes that actually will
result in a panel decision. If you compare this with the bilateral Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) between the United States and Canada, there has been a lot
more restraint here. You had decisions in the Salmon's Herring case, 1 for
example, in the bilateral FTA before the five-year deadline.
If you look at Chapter 19, as soon as you have private party involvement
in the dispute settlement process, the numbers tend to grow. But still, fiftytwo cases are reasonable when compared to the volume of trade. The pattern
under the bilateral U.S.-Canada FTA, I would say, is repeated here in terms
of the defending investigating authority. In 54% of the cases, it was the U.S.
Department of Commerce. In 17% of the cases, it was the Mexican Ministry
of Foreign Trade. In 29% of the cases, it was the Deputy Minister of National
Revenue or the Canadian International Trade Tribunal.
If you look at Chapter 11, you have a total of fourteen cases. Damages
sought by private parties average 211 million dollars. So parties tend to use
Chapter 11 only for very significant cases. We have had clients at the firm
that had very clear textbook examples of Chapter 11 violations by the
Mexican government and decided not to sue because they value a good ongoing relationship with the administration. As you can see, the amounts in
dispute here are quite significant: 750 million dollars in the Loewen case,2
900 million dollars in one of the other cases. But, in general, they average out
to 211 million dollars.
There were two ways to write Chapter XI. By including a precise
defimition of every concept and situation that is likely to jeopardize an
investor's rights, or by including broad terms and principles, leaving the case
by case application to the ebb and flow of arbitral wisdom. It was this second
model that was adopted. It will be up to arbitrators to decide on a case-bycase basis.
What are the major challenges in the years to come? For Mexico,
certainly a sustained flow of foreign direct investments, and that would mean
I Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, (1998) 35S
B.I.S.D. 98 (Panel Report adopted Mar. 22, 1998).
2See Lowen Group, Inc. v. United States, Notice of Claim, Oct.
31, 1998. See also
Harmonization Project, Briefing Paper, Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States (visited July 28,
2000) <http://www.harmonizationalert.org/NAFTA/loewen.htm>.
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opening up sectors that remained closed under the NAFTA. There are
significant opportunities in the energy, telecommunications and financial
sectors.
There is a need for transparency in Mexico. There are still instances
where the processes for developing regulations is not as transparent as it
should be; a chance for private industry to have some input into the way
regulations are designed and put in place. There are efficiency gains that are
to be captured if NAFIA firms use the market-making capability of the
Internet to source materials and to export finished goods within the region.
There is a discussion, at least in academia, as to whether a free trade market
should evolve into a common market.
For the time being, it does not seem like the NAFTA can evolve into a
common market, but there are at least some common institutions.
Competition will be one of the tough topics that the three countries will have
to tackle in the years to come.

